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Preface
In preparing the present report, the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly visited Kiev,
Ukraine, on 4th-6th April 1995. During this visit, the committee and your Rapporteur were extremely for-
tunate to receive much kind help and assistance from all the authorities with whom they had discussions
and would like to take this opportunity publicly to thank all concerned for their kindness and co-operation.
The programme of the committee's visit included the following meetings and visits:
4ttr April 1995 Meeting with the Chairman of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, N{r. O. Monoz
Meeting with the Head of the Defence and State Security Committee, Mr. V. Mouxunt,
and members of the committee and representatives from the Foreign Affairs Ministry
5th April 1995 Meeting with the First Deputy Minister of Defence, Commander of the General Head-
quarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General A. Lopnra
Visit to a housing complex for the military staff of Ukraine's armed forces, built with
financial support from the German Government
Visit to a military unit
6th April 1995 Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. G. Ouoovnxro
Meeting with the Deputy Minister of the military-industrial complex, Mr. Valery P.
Kazarov
Meeting with representatives of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Supreme
Rada of Ukraine
Visit to the Antonov aircraft works
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Drafi Recommendatian
on Ukraine and European securily
The Assembly,
(i) Aware of Ukraine's positive contribution to security and stability in Europe through the implemen-
tation of the trilateral declaration of January 1994 to dispose of all nuclear weapons on its territory and
through its decision to accede to the non-protferation treity as a non-nuclear stafe;
(ii) Noting that the continued existence of Ukraine as an independent state and its abiliry to make fur-
ther progress in transforming its economy and society depends greatly on international support and co-
operation;
(iii) Aware that the conclusion of a comprehensive treary of friendship and co-operation between
Russia and Ukraine is of vital importance for the independence and security of Ukraine as well as for the
stability of the region;
(iv) Noting that in recent months Russia has apparently not been forthcoming in the negotiations prepa-
ring the abovementioned treaty;
(v) Aware that Ukraine will not be able to restructure and reorganise its armed forces and the defence
of its territory until a final agreement on the division of the Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure has been
concluded with Russia;
(vi) Deploring Russia's unilateral decision to extend its armed forces in northern Caucasus with the
newly-created 58th army in violation of the CFE Treaty;
(vii) Noting that any suggestions to modify the CFE Treaty should be discussed exclusively in the fra-
mework of the 1996 review conference;
(viii) Regretting the continued presence of the Russian 14th army in the Trans-Dniesff region, far beyond
the borders of Russian territory;
(ix) Noting that an early enlargement of NAIO would not be conducive to stability in Europe and could
ffansform Ukraine into a buffer state between a newly-opposed East and West;
(x) Noting that in view of WEU's status as part of the process of European integration, closer links bet-
ween Llkraine and WEU cannot be considered as threatening any third country in Europe;
(xi) Aware that the WEU Council of Ministers attaches particular importance to appropriate relation-
ships with Russia and Ukraine;
(xii) Welcoming the decision of the Permanent Council of WEU on the organisation of the dialogue with
Russia and I-lkraine, which will allow for exchanges of information on issues of common interest;
(.riii,) Stressing, however, that, compared with Russia, Ukraine since its independence has shown a far
more positive attitude in its active policy towards building security in Europe,
RrcovnmNos rHAr rrm Cowcu-
l. Continue to intensify the security dialogue with Ukraine, paying attention in p4rticular to its speci-
fic r6le in the European security architecture;
2. Make clear in its security dialogue with Russia that the early conclusion of a treaty of friendship and
co-operation between Russia and Ukraine is of vital importance for security in Europe.
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Explnnatary Memorandum
(submifred by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur)
I.Introdaction
1. Since its existence as an independent state
in 1991, Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that its
overall policy is dedicated to the promotion of
peace and stability in Europe. The signing of the
trilateral statement on l4th January 1994 and
accession to the non-proliferation fieaty as a non-
nuclear state have been the most obvious manifest-
ations of this policy, but Ukraine has also made
efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem
of Crimean separatism. Minorities are enjoying
respect.
2. Nevertheless, in Western Europe, there are
still doubts over Ukraine's position in the Euro-
pean framework. Addressing the Assembly of
WEU in December 1993, the former Foreign
Minister of Ukraine stated that Ukraine conside-
red itself to be an organic and inseparable part of
the Central and Eastern European region. He also
said that " a single all-European security space
can be created only by securing regional stability
in Central and Eastern Europe and by providing
this region's organic linkage with Western Euro-
pean security structures ".
3. More than a year ago, in the Kirchberg
declaration of May 1994, the WEU Council of
Ministers agreed that the policy conducted by
Ukraine widened the base for the development of
dialogue and exchange of information with Ukraine
on issues of common concern. Since then, this
dialogue with Ukraine has indeed been developed
further.
4. In this framework, the Defence Committee
of the WEU Assembly considered it useful to pay
a visit to Ukraine in 6rder to discuss a numbei oi
issues with the political and military authorities in
Kiev. The results of this visit held in April 1995
are presented in the present report.
II. Reforun of the economy
5. After his election in July 1994, President
Kuchma made it clear that the reform of Ukraine's
economy is one of his main objectives. The
Supreme Rada's approval of a tough 1995 state
budget with a 7.3Vo ftscal deficit, as had been
agreed between President Kuchma and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, paved the way for more
financial support. On 9th April 1995, the IMF
approved credits for Ukraine up to a total amount
of $1.96 billion to support the government's eco-
nomic prograrnme for 1995. Of this total amount,
$1.57 billion is being made available as a one-
year stand-by credit, while another $392 million
is to be disbursed in a support progmmme for the
transition to a market economy.
6. Shortly before approving the 1995 budget,
the Supreme Rada passed a motion of no confi-
dence in protest against the government's radical
economic policy. Observers noted that it provided
President Kuchma with an opportunity to replace
cabinet ministers opposed to economic reform.
The President is seeking to reduce the parlia-
ment's leverage in economic policy and to
increase his own executive power.
7. Under former President Kravchuk, the
Ulaainian Government has been reluctant to take
radical measures to restore the national economy.
Recent figures confirmed, however, that the
efforts of succeeding govemments have met with
some success.
8. Inflation went down from 4 7357o n 1993
to 8427o in 1994 and Ukraine has a commifrnent
to the IMF to bring it down further to 2l0Vo in
1995. GDP diminished by l47o rn 1993,23Vo in
1994 and a 57o redtction is expected for 1995.
The budget deficit went from 30.4Vo of GDP in
1992 to lO.lVo in 1993 and 9.6Vo in 1994. The
government has promised the IMF to keep it
between 3 and 4Vo in 1995.
9. Efforts are now being made to accelerate
privatisation, which had started only very reluc-
tantly under President Kravchuk. In fact, the
2 000 companies which were privatised during
1992 ard 1993 could not be acquired by external
investors.
10. The government now intends to privatise
8 000 large and medium-sized companies in the
next two years. Under the new system, personali-
sed vouchers will be distributed to the population
which can be swapped for shares at regional pri-
vatisation cenfies responsible for co-ordination.
11. The new privatisation programme is sup-
ported by the European Union via its TACIS pro-
gramme (Technical Assistance for the Common-
wealth of Independent States), and by USAID
(United States Agency for lnternational Develop-
ment) and the World Bank.
12. As far as the agricultural sector is concer-
ned, agricultural products have now been privati-
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sed, which means that kolkhozes are responsible
for selling their products. They will receive the
full price, but state subsidies have been stopped.
A first start is being made with limited privatisa-
tion of farmland, but the government 1s acting
carefully here because it wishes to avoid a com-
plete disintegration.
13. On 11th April 1995, the World Bank appro-
ved a $114 million loan to support a prograrnme
envisaging to dismantle Ukraine's eight vertically-
integrated electric power monopolies and replace
them with four independent competing electricity
generators. Earlier, President Kuchma had publi-
shed a decree to set up a national electricity pool
authorising denationalisation of four plants and
creating 27 local electricity distribution compa-
nies'.
14. As is the case in other former Soviet repu-
blics, foreign investors have been reluctant to
invest money in the Ukrainian market because of
shortcomings in legislation and unpredictable
overnight changes to trading rules and tax laws.
III. Debt and financinl assistnnce
15. On 20th March, Ukraine and Russia signed
an agreement on the repayment of Ukraine's debt
of $4.2 billion to Russia. According to this agree-
ment, $2.7 billion will be paid offduring a twelve-
year period. A debt of $1.5 billion for deliveries
of natural gas by Russia's Gazprom company has
been converted into government bonds. Ukraine
has also promised to pay its energy bills for 1995.
16. Ukraine's financing gap for 1995 is estima-
ted at $5.5 billion. This will be covered by a $600
million loan from the World Bank, a debt settle-
ment with Russia and bilateral contributions
amounting to $800 million, of which the Euro-
pean Union should contribute $400 million. The
European Union contribution has not yet been
agteed, since some member states, in particular
France, have insisted on linking financial support
to the dismantlement of the Chernobyl nuclear
power station. On 13th April 1995, a basic agree-
ment on the closure and dismantlement of Cher-
nobyl's nuclear power station was reached, but
the financial consequences of the agreement
remain to be negotiated.
17. During recent months, there has been a pro-
tracted debate among European Union members
over financial assistance to Ukraine. From the
beginning, Germany, supported by the European
Commission, has pleaded for early and generous
financial aid in order to prevent Ukraine's econo-
mic collapse and to preserve the countr5r's inde-
pendence.
Loans received by Ulcraine from internalional
fi na nc ial in s titutio n s ( I 9 9 3 - 9 5 )
EBRD
1. Project of reconstruction of the interna-




2. Project of development of small- and




3. Project of reconstruction of Kiev's mar-




4. Loan for reorganisation of financial and




5. Loan for regulation of payment crisis




1. The support of Ukrainian payment
balance (24th October t994) 
-$742mil-
lion.




18. Of an 85 million ecu aid package promised
by the European Union and a $1.9 billion aid pack-
age promised by the G-7, nothing has yet been
received because of continuing negotiations over
the financial consequences of the closure and dis-
mantlement of Chernobyl.
IV. Ukraine's foreign policy
19. In October 1994, outlining his economic
reform programme to the Supreme Rada, Presi-
dent Kuchma called for a " strategic partnership "
with Russia and Ukraine's fully-fledged participa-
tion in the sffengthening and development of the
economic community within the bounds of the
ClS, arguing that the continuation of the " pre-
vious policy of self-isolation is economic and
political suicide "2. At the same time, he stressed
that enhanced co-operation with Russia and the
CIS should not be at the expense of relations with
the West nor allow any threat to Ukraine's territo-
rial integrity or independence.
20. The Llkrainian Government is perfectly
well aware that its concerns over Russia's attitude
and influence cannot be neutralised by alliances
with the West. The objective is therefore to make
Ukraine a non-nuclear, non-bloc, regional power
with diversified interests, capable of co-operating
with all parmers to the detriment of none.
L Financial Times, llth April 1995. 2. Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1994, page 568.
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21. The " Main Directions of Ukrainian
Foreign Policy " adopted by the Supreme Rada on
2nd July 1993, established the following four
priorities:
- 
cultivate good bilateral relations which
can help to renew old ties and as a result
facittate Ukraine's integration into the
wider global and European order;
- 
intensify regional co-operation with such
organisations as the OSCE, the North
Atlantic Alliance and the European
Union. The partnership and co-operation
agreepent with the European Union is
considered a first step towards fulImem-
bership;
- 
participation in the CIS, while rejecting
any CIS supranational competences;
- 
full co-operation with the United Nations
and its specialised agencies.
22. On different occasions, Ukraine has stres-
sed its neutrality and non-bloc status and the pol-
icy of non-alignment adopted by the Supreme
Rada in the abovementioned document is still
valid. It is also argued, however, that non-align-
ment in a Europe no longer divided into two blocs
does not exclude co-operation with regional orga-
nisations. In Ukraine, this policy is called " active
neutrality ".
23. National security is a main concern for the
government which takes the view that any form of
co-operation with, and integration in, existing
European institutions and organisations will
enhance Ukraine's security and conffibute to its
survival as a state. Participation in NATO's part-
nership for peace initiative is now firmly under
way, and the partnership and co-operation agree-
ment with the European Union, signed on 14th
June 1994, awaits ratification in the European
Union member states. A structured dialogue has
been established with WEU and Ukraine hopes to
be admitted as a member of the Council of Eur-
ope in the near future.
24. A good working relationship has been esta-
blished with the OSCE and Mr. Max van der
Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities, has recently accomplished a mission
in Ukraine dealing with the situation in the Cri-
mean peninsula.
25. The policy of non-alignment does, how-
ever, prevent Ukraine from signing a collective
security agreement providing for a collective res-
ponse to aggression against any of its signatories,
as was signed by six CIS member states in Tash-
kent in May 1992. Likewise, it cannot be a mem-
ber of NATO. Ukraine is not in favour of the
enlargement of NATO to include certain Central
European states because it might transform
Ukraine into a buffer state and lead to Russian
pressure to sign a collective security agreement
similar to the Tashkent agreement.
26. Ukraine takes the view that enlargement of
NAIO should be evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary, adding that enlargement may be less des-
tabilising in a few years' time, when Ukraine
hopes to have better consolidated its own position
as an independent state.
V Defence spending and the restracturing
of the armedforces
27. Ukraine is considerably reducing its def-
ence budget because of a chronic shortage offinan-
cial resources, which has understandably a serious
impact on the resfucturing of its armed forces.
28. ln 1994, 14741 billion karbovantsy were
allocated to defence spending, while the military
had asked for 63 700 billion.
29. On22nd March 1995, the Supreme Rada
adopted a defence budget envisaging substantial
new cuts in funding and troop levels. In 1995,
defence spending will again fall below the
requests of the defence establishment to 2.64o of
GDP, or 120.000 billion karbovantsy (around
$800 million). According to the Defence Minis-
ury, this would meet only lTVo of expected costs,
down from 34Vo \n 1992. With this budget, it will
hardly be possible to cover pensions, salaries and
basic supplies while housing is still lacking for
70 000 military personnel. It will also be extreme-
ly difficult to pay for equipment maintenance,
modernisation or disarmament which, as a conse-
guence, will be postponed to a later date3.
Ukraine's shrinking military o
Troopstlrgth Co(xrl UmEy hdsct ?!t@ 68.t4 otq
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3. This does not refer to CFE Treaty arms reductions which
Ukraine is implementing as required by the treary. Recently it
indicated that it may need westem financial aid for full
implementation by November 1995.





30. All these factors may slow down Ukraine's
objective to reduce its armed forces to 250 000
troops by 1997. These stood at 726000 troops
when the country became independent and
strengths are planned to be reduced to 400 000 by
the end of 1995.
31. The government is also aware of the fact
that releasing large numbers of officers and sol-
diers on a contracting labour market without pro-
viding them with adequate social protection may
create another element of social instability.
32. In July 1994, legislation was introduced to
clarify the r0le of the Defence Ministry and dis-
tinguish it from that of the General Staff. The
Defence Ministry now has responsibility for iden-
tification of threats to Ukraine, management of
the military industrial complex and the conver-
sion process, and defining criteria for co-opera-
tion with other ministries. Shortly afterwards,
President Kuchma appointed Valery Shmarov as
Ukraine's flrst civilian Defence Minister.
33. With ethnic Russians forming a majority in
many units in the early stage of transformation of
the armed forces, a Social-Psychological Service
was established with responsibility for the patrio-
tic education of military personnel or the " rebuil-
ding of morale with a Ukrainian spirit ". Predicta-
bly, a number of zealots overstepped the limits of
their task, which made the service rather unpopu-
lar among certain sections of the armed forces. It
has now been renamed the Main Administration
for Educational and Social-Psychological Work
and is taking a more pragmatic approach.
34. In the reorganisation of the armed forces,
the Carpathian and Odessa military districts were
replaced by two operational commands, Western
and Southern, each with three corps. The head-
quarters of the Kiev military district has become
both the Ukrainian General Staffand the National
Ministry of Defence.
35. The airforce and the air defence branch of
the army have been combined in practically the
only major reallocation of r6les and resources to
have taken place outside the navy. The allocation
of troops between the former Soviet military dis-
tricts on Ukrainian territory has remained practi
cally unchanged since independence.
36. It is also noted that the organisation of a
command and control structure, subject to the
central authorities in Kiev, in accordance with a
concept of defence which shapes the armed forces
into a cohesive force reflecting the needs of the
state, will still take some time to be completed.
37. In fact, the armed forces as inherited from
the former Soviet Union are still more suited to
their traditional r6le of frst strike offensive in a
western direction than to defensive operations in all
directions, as required by the new military doctrine.
38. When it emerged at an early stage that the
division of the Black Sea fleet would be a compli-
cated matter, taking years to resolve', Ukraine
decided to start creating its own navy based on an
Apil 1992 presidential decree. A naval command
was appointed, crews for Utr<rainian naval ships
were formed and shipyards were commissioned to
build new ships. The navy headquarters, a naval
academy and some units were located in Sebasto-
pol. At the moment, the Ukrainian navy has about
ten large or medium-sized ships, more than forty
smaller patrol craft and several other surface
ships. Among the large and medium-sized ships
are a command and reconnaissance ship, a guided
missile cruiser, two frigates, and four destroyers.
A new frigate was launched in 1994. Last year,
Ukraine took over the Black Sea fleet's 318th
division which is planned to provide Ukraine's
frst coastguard unit6.
39. High inflation and a continuing shortage of
funds and energy are some of the problems which
the new Ukrainian navy is facing. There is a shor-
tage of housing and the navy has problems in
paymg wages.
40. In October 1993, the Supreme Rada adopted
a national military doctrine with a political, techni-
cal and economic section. This document argues
against the stationing of foreign troops on its terri-
tory or that of other states, without agreement and
states that " fJkraine will consider its potential
adversary to be any state whose consistent policy
constitutes a military danger to Ukraine "7.
41. The armed forces have a r6le in defending
Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity,
in protecting Ukraine's borders, its ports and ship-
ping in the Black Sea area and in maintaining
internal order. They must also be able to respond
to the need for peace-keeping in the region and to
integrate with allies and partnerss.
42. The guiding principles of the military doc-
trine's economic section are: the preservation of
the country's military-industrial base for maxi-
mum benefit to the armed forces in line with
financial aid and material constraints; the attain-
ment of an advanced system of armament; an eco-
logically safe and economically feasible system
of arming forces and dismantling weapons; and a
rational conversion prograrnme.
43. Ukraine's intention of becoming a non-
nuclear state was carefully worded as follows:
" Having become the owner of nuclear
weapons through historical circumstances,
5. See Chapter VI of the present report.
6. RFE/RL Research report, 6th May 1994.
7. RFE/RL Research report, 28th January 1994.
8. Vyacheslav Pikovshek and Christopher Pett: Transforma-
tion of the Ukrainian armed forces, NAIO Review No. 5,
October 1994.
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Ukraine will never sanction their use and
excludes the threat to use nuclear weapons
from its foreign policy arsenal. In the
future, Ukraine intends to become a non-
nuclear state and links the reduction and
destruction of nuclear weapons with appro-
priate actions by other nuclear states and
the granting by them and by the world com-
munity of reliable security guarantees. "
Meanwhile, Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-
nuclear state in December 1994'.
VI. The divixian of the Blnck Seafl.eet
4. Immediately after the establishment of
Ilkraine's independence in December 1991, Pre-
sident Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree on the
Ukrainian armed forces outlining the structure of
the armed forces. Ukraine claimed all former
Soviet military hardware and forces on its terri-
tory, with the exception of the sfrategic forces. As
a consequence, Ukraine claimed the ownership of
almost the entire Black Sea fleet, a claim disputed
by Russia, which argued that the fleet was a stra-
t6gic force. When measures were taken and
conflicting decrees were issued by both sides lead-
ing to a chaotic situation, the Presidents of both
countries suspended their decrees in April 1992
and agreed to holding negotiations on the issue.
45. The Black Sea fleet is said to consist of
some 440 ships, including about forty major sur-
face ships, eighteen submarines and 250 smaller
ships, but the total number of ships to be divided
is 833, taking account of a large number of non-
combat and other small vessels. It also has some
300 naval aircraft and helicopters and 70 000 per-
sonnel. The majority of officers are Russian, but
6OVo of the conscripts are local recruits from Cri-
mea. It should be noted that, at present, a narge
part of the fleet is not operational because of dis-
iepair or lack of maintenance. The average age of
ships in the fleet is between fifteen and twenty
years and, with a continued lack of maintenance,
the fleet would be completely ineffective by the
year 2000. The negotiations over the Black Sea
fleet have now been dragging on for more than
three years. Of the many issues involved, mention
could be made of loyalty oaths to the trvo respec-
tive states, the fleet's infrastructure, which is
worth more than the fleet's ships, the status of the
Crimean peninsula where most of the infrastruc-
ture is located and the financing of the fleet.
46. On different occasions, in particular June
1992, June 1993, September 1993 (Massandra)
and April 1994, an agreement was announced
which later fell apart or did not materialise.
47. The main bone of contention is access to
the attendant bases and, in particular, to Sebasto-
pol which ha s 827o of the fleet's infrastructure and
which is of historical and national significance to
both Russia and Ukraine. Russia has insisted that
Sebastopol will remain as the main base of the
Russian Black Sea fleet, not to be shared with
Ukraine. Access to the Crimean naval bases is an
issue of strategic importance. For Russia, it would
facilitate the exercise of influence in the Black
Sea region, including the Balkans.
VI I. Impleme ntatian of the trilateral stateme nt
on nuclcar weapons
48. Ukraine inherited 176 intercontinental bal-
listic missiles with nuclear warheads and 41 stra-
tegic bombers from the Soviet Union. Although
Russia was in fulI control of the launch codes and
Ukraine had neither the technology nor the finan-
cial means to store these weapons properly or to
gain control over them, it was generally thought
to be an undesirable situation. Ukraine used the
presence of these strategic nuclear weapons as
leverage both to assert its newly-acquired position
as an independent state and to be granted financial
aid in case it decided to give them up.
49. In January 1994, after complicated negotia-
tions, Ukraine signed a trilateral statement with
Russia and the United States to give up its strate-
gic nuclear arsenal in exchange for about $1 bil-
lion in nuclear fuel supplies and financial assis-
tance for disarmament. ln the trilateral statement,
Ukraine undertook to fransfer to Russia at least
200 nuclear warheads for dismantling within ten
months. Ukraine also promised to eliminate,
within seven years, all nuclear weapons, inclu-
ding stategic offensive arrnso on its territory. Rus-
sia, with Ukraine's co-operation, was to ensure
the servicing and safety of nuclear warheads pend-
ing their transfer to Russia for destruction. Russia
and the United States would work to place all
Ukraine's nuclear activities under the safeguard
of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in order to legalise the unimpeded export
of Russian fuel assemblies to Ukraine.
50. Shortly afterwards, on 3rd February 1994,
the Supreme Rada ratified the START I Treaty
and the Lisbon Protocol, which associated the
Soviet successor states with the sTART I Treaty.
Following ratification by the Supreme Rada on
l6th November 1994, Ukraine acceded to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty CI{PT) as a non-
nuclear weapons state on 5th December 1995. In
the context of Ukraine's accession to the NPT,
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and
the United States have extended written security
assurances. These assurances concern the
commitment of these states to seek immediate
Security Council action in certain circumstances9. See also Chapter VII of the present report.
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involving the use, or threat of the use, of nuclear
weapons against Ukraine as a non-nuclear wea-
pons state party to the NPT.
51. At the same time, these states undertook to
recognise Ukraine's territorial inviolability and
not to infringe its sovereignty through economic
force. Ukraine's accession to the NPT also
enabled the START I Treaty to enter into force
between Russia and the United States on 5th
December 1994 and opened the way for ratif,rca-
tion of START II. The entry into force of START
II may be delayed because of the negative impact
of Russia's violent military intervention in Chech-
nya on relations between Russia and the United
States. At the Russian-United States summit meet-
ing in Moscow on 10th May 1995, both Presi-
dents promised to push for raffication by their
respective parliaments before the end of 1995, but
with Russian parliamentary elections scheduled
for December, ratification is unlikely to take place
quite so soon. There is also strong hesitation in the
United States Congress.
52. Ukraine is now fully implementing the sta-
tement and is transferring its nuclear warheads to
Russia for destruction. According to Colonel-
General A. Lopata, all intercontinental ballistic
missiles on Ukraine's territory have been deact-
ivated. On the other hand, [Ikraine has noted,
regretfully, that of a total amount of $500 million
p[omised by the United States for the dismantling
of nuclear weapons, it has so far only received
$100 million.
53. Utrraine is trying to negotiate the sale of its
twenty Tu-160 (Blackjack) and twenty-three Tir-
95H @ear 2) strategic bombers to Russia in
exchange for spare parts for its Russian-supplied
weapons and maintenance for its Russian-made
aircraft.
V I I I. C F E imp lerne ntati,o n
54. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE), signed in Paris in November 1990,
was drawn up for the deployment of conventional
armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals. In the area defined in the treaty, the combi-
ned member states of NATO and the combined
former Warsaw Pact states are each entitled to
have a maximum of 20 000 tanks, 20 000 artillery
units, 30 000 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 800
fighter aircraft and 2 000 attack helicopters. The
treaty also includes regional and flank limitations
in order to prevent threatening concentrations of
armed forces in specific areas.
55. The arms reductions envisaged in the treaty
were to be implemented in three phases:20Vo by
September 1993, 60Vo by September 1994 and
l00%o by November 1995. The flank limitations,
which exclusively concern Russia's military dis-
tricts ofleningrad (now St. Petersburg) and north
Caucasus and the south-eastern part of Ukraine's
territory will come into force in November 1995.
56. At their Tashkent summit meeting in May
1992, the successor states of the Soviet Union
participating in the CIS divided among them-
selves the CFE ffeaty-limited equipment (TLE) of
the former Soviet Union. According to this divi-
sion, Ukraine is entitled to a maximum of 4 080
tanks, 5 050 infanhry fighting vehicles, 4 040
artillery units, 1 090 aircraft and 330 attack heli-
copters.
57 . Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, Ukraine
is committed to remove from service almost 2 000
tanks, more than I 000 armoured vehicles and
around 300 military aircraft. In general, Ukraine
has been complying with the disarmament sche-
dule until now, but the serious financial problems
of the armed forces may lead to requests for wes-
tern financial assistance to complete the dismantl-
ing of the remaining surplus of CFE Treaty-limi-
ted equipment.
58. Within the framework of the armed forces'
restructuring, the Kiev, Carpathian and Odessa
military districts were reorganised in 1992, but,
since then, the CFE Treaty-limited equipment
quotas set for these districts have remained in
force, which has resulted in an unbalanced and
rather illogical deployment of arms and equip-
ment across the country. For example, the freaty
allows for 680 tanks in the Odessa district, cove-
ring the southern part of Ukraine and 3 400 tanks
in the Carpathian and Kiev district, covering the
western part.
59. In September 1993, Llkraine was the frst
state to re-open the subject of flank limitations. It
asked for a revision of the CFE Treaty, arguing
that CFE limits on the deployment of its arma-
ments inside its own borders are based on flank
limitations which have become irelevant with the
dissolution of the two-bloc opposition in Europe.
Implementation of the treaty, it was argued, would
force Ukraine to defend one quarter of its terri-
tory with lTVo of itstzrks,TVo of its infanry fight-
ing vehicles and 22Vo of its artillery units.
60. Later, Russia also insisted on a revision of
the CFE Treaty which, according to Defence
Ministet Pavel Grachev, interferes with Russia's
strategic interests. Russia argues that the treaty
does not provide sufficient forces and equipment
for the defence and protection of its south-western
border. As a consequence of flank limitations,
Russia is allowed to deploy only ISVo of its armed
forces in the military districts of Leningrad and
north Caucasus, which together cover more than
half of its European territory. According to the
CFE Treaty, Russia is allowed to deploy not more
than 700 tanks, 580 armoured vehicles and 1 280
artillery units at its south-western border in the
DOCI.JMENT 1464
north Caucasus disfrict. At present, Russia consi-
ders the Norttr Caucasus military district as its
most important line of defence.
61. A revision of CFE flank limitations could
therefore also lead to redeployment of Russian
forces in the north Caucasus military district bor-
dering on Ukraine, a consequence which would
certainly not contribute to an enhanced feeling of
security in Ukraine. Until now, NATO has rejec-
ted all requests to change flank limitations, refer-
ring any discussion on the implementation of the
CFE Treaty to the 1996 review conference.
62. On 26th April 1995, Russia announced its
decision to extend its armed forces in the north
Caucasus through the creation of a new force, the
58th Russian army, by June 1995. The 58th army
will be created on the basis of an existing army
corps in Madikavkaz, north Ossetia, to which new
units will be added. Implementation of this deci-
sion would constitute a violation of the CFE
Treaty.
63. Ukraine has implemented its CFE Treaty
obligations and does not intend taking any unila-
teral decision which would go against the treaty. It
insists, however, that there are anomalies in the
treaty which should be renegotiated. Potential
adjustrnents should take into account the positions
of all the European states and security organisa-
tions concerned.
U. In a statement after his summit meeting
with President Yeltsin on l1th May 1995, Presi-
dent Clinton stated that he supported the Russian
request for modifications in the CFE Treaty. He
added that he wanted to " figure out a way to pre-
serve the integdty of the treaty, and compliance
with it, but in the end respond to the legitimate
security requests of Russia 'o'0.
armour and guns from Russia. The Antonov
scientific-technical research complex in Kiev
built Antonov aircraft, including the largest trans-
port aircraft in the world.
66. Moreover, Ukraine had a large capacity for
producing ammunition, optical equipment, mili-
tary lasers and elecronics. Ukraine's defence
indusfiry received little to no orders in 1991 and
1992 and, as a result, its output declined three-fold
with many factories working only two or three
days a week. Continuing government subsidies
saved them from bankruptcy, but, at the same time,
these subsidies were creating hyper-inflation.
67. The disintegration of the Soviet Union into
different independent republics has caused pro-
blems in the supply of specific products which are
needed for the production of weapons systems,
while the rapid decline of the value of the Ukrai-
nian karbovantsy against the Russian rouble is
causing problems for payment. Facing the possi-
ble social and economic consequences of a col-
lapse of this important branch of Ukraine's indus-
try, the government had no choice but to act.
68. A presidential decree ofJanuary 1992pro-
vided a number of measures to help companies
achieve conversion. Conversion efforts were
directed mainly at enterprises which exclusively
produced military items. Activities for civilian
production should concentrate on agricultural
machinery medical and environmental equip-
ment, food packaging and processing and consu-
mer goods. The government also thought that
conversion could be successful in the production
of missiles and other items for the civilian aero-
space markets. A state fund for conversion was
established. In mid-1992, the Ukrainian Govern-
ment proposed a five-year conversion plan
consisting of 540 prograrnmes. Estimates of the
cost of the conversion programme have varied
from $5 billion for five years to $2 billion plus
650 billion coupons over ten years. [t should be
noted, however, that in 1992 the defence industry
only obtained one quarter of what it had requested
for conversion.
69. In June 1994, the Ministry of Defence dis-
closed a preliminary prograrnme which aims at a
dual r61e for the defence industry: to satisfy the
equipment needs of the Ukrainian armed forces in
practically all fields in order to reduce its depen-
dency on Russia and at the same time produce for
the export markets.
70. At present, the ministry for the military
industrial complex has responsibility over the
remaining total of I 700 production units and
research establishments. Its priority tasks are
conversion and privatisation. In this framework,
the ministry is trying to establish relations with
Western European countries and the North Ameri-
can continent.
IX. Ukraine's defence industry
65. ln the former Soviet Union, Ukraine had
the second largest military industrial complex
with l87o of the entire complex on its territory. A
total of more than 1 800 enterprises employed 2.7
million workers, out of which around 700 facili-
ties employed 1.3 million, exclusively producing
military items. It is estimated that this sector of
the industry contributed one-third of Ukraine's
GNP. Among the most important industries were
the southern machine building plant, building
strategic missiles such as the SS-18, SS-20, SS-23
and SS-24, space shuttles and satellites and the
Black Sea shipyard in Mikolayev, where most
Soviet ships were built according to Russian desi-
gns. The Malyshev plant and design bureau in
Kharkov produced T-64,T-72 and T-80 tanks with
10. Financial Times, llth May 1995.
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71. After the trilateral agreement on nuclear
weapons of January 1994, a joint Ukrainian-
United States committee was established to dis-
cuss military conversion and nuclear weapon
issues. Ukraine also established a control r6gime
for nuclear exports in full accordance with inter-
national standards, which was a condition for the
development of relations with western partners.
Co-operation projects have now been concluded
with France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, the United States and others.
72. Mary conversion activities have been
undertaken and there are the by now well-known
examples of missile factories having converted
part of their activities to the production of trolley
buses and watches, and a nuclear submarine
equipment factory turned over to the production
of antennas, burglar alarms, car radios, food
mixers and microwave ovens.
73. As a specific example, mention is made
here of a joint venture announced in January 1 995
between a company from the United Kingdom, a
company from the United States and the Ukrai-
nian Defence Ministry. In the new company,
Alliant Kiev, the foreign partners provide techno-
logy, capital and know-how while Ukraine's
army provides arms and labour to dismantle
conventional munitions and reclaim the metals
and explosives for profit. Over the next five years,
Alliant Kiev plans to destroy 220 OOO tons of
munitions r'.
74. An important part of Ukraine's military
industrial complex is its well-developed space
industry, building launch vehicles, space shuttles
and satellites which, understandably, it does not
want to give up. Therefore, in 1992, President
Kravchuk published a decree to establish the
Ukrainian National Cosmic Agency (UNCA) to
ensure that the existing human and technical
resources in this field would not be lost.
75. The UNCA developed a national space pro-
gramme envisaging co-operation with Russia and
Kazakhstan, manufacture of space products such
as launch vehicles and satellites for the world
market and co-operation with western countries in
space technology and joint programmes. A posi-
tive step towards possible co-operation with wes-
tern companies and space programmes was taken
when, on 17th Isf.ay 1994, Ukraine adhered to the
missile technology control r6gime which pledged
it to prevent missile technology proliferation. A
co-operation programme has been signed with
A6rospatiale to improve the performance of the
Ariane launch vehicle's rocket motors and other
co-operation agrcements have been concluded
with NASA. Meanwhile, there is intensive co-
operation in space prograrnmes with Russia and
Kazakhstan.
76. Given the fact that 80Vo of its defence
industry was dependent on Russian parts, Ukraine
is aware that its defence industry can only survive,
even partially, if it co-operates with the Russian
defence industry. In January 1993, therefore, both
countries signed an agreement onjoint co-opera-
tion in a number of activities such as aircraft pro-
duction, rocket and space technology, electronics
and aircraft engines. One of the most interesting
co-operation prograrnmes between Ukraine and
Russia in this framework is the development of
the AN-70 transport aircraft. A second prototype
is being built at the Antonov scientific-technical
research complex in Kiev. The AN-70, equipped
with four turbo-fan engines, can carry 30-35 tons
over a distance of 4 000 to 5 000 kilomeffes, at a
speed of 750 kilometres per hour. With a weight
of 130 tons, it is capable of landing on short run-
ways and transporting troops and equipment into
the heart of potential combat zones. Assembly-
line production was planned to start in 1996-97,
but the programme may be delayed after the
recent crash of the first prototype. On the world
market for military transport aircraft, the AN-70
will be a competitor for the future large aircraft(FLA), now being developed by a European
consortium.
77. Other branches of Ukraine's defence indus-
try have been less fortunate.
78. The Sebastopol marine plant, a naval ship-
yard for repair and upgrading, is now working at
one-third or one-fourth of its capacity. The Cher-
nomorskye shipyard in Nikolayev on the Black
Sea has stopped building aircraft carriers and crui-
sers and is now focusing on the construction of
smaller vessels.
79. The problems with the aircraft-carrier
Varyag are illustrative of problems in the Ukrai-
nian military industrial complex. The Varyag was
under construction at the Chernomorskye ship-
yard when the Soviet Union collapsed. Arms and
electronic equipment for the carrier were to be
provided by Russia. It was 60Vo completed in
January 1992, burt since then little progress has
been made, in particular, because of a shortage of
money. Russia has offered the carrier to Ukraine,
but Ukraine prefers to sell it to a foreign customer.
lf no customer can be found 
- 
China has been sug-
gested as a potential buyer but this could not be
confirmed during the Defence Committee's visit
to Kiev 
- 
Ukraine will sell the carrier for scrap.
80. In an effort to sell its defence industry pro-
ducts on the export market, Ukraine has now
developed a 3 000 ton patrol vessel which was on
show at the International Defence Exhibition in
the United Arab Emirates in March 1995. Other
smaller vessels have also been developed for
export, such as a fast and manoeuvrable hydrofoil.
The Malyshev plant in Kharkov has now develo-
ped the T-84 tank, an improved version of the11. Financial Times,20th January 1995.
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well-known Soviet T-80 tank, which is available
for export.
81. With these and other equipment, Ukraine is
planning to increase its arms exports from $100
million n 1993 to $10 bffion by the year 2000.
82. It cannot be denied that the Ukrainian
Government has taken strides to tackle the prob-
lems of its huge military indusfrial complex with
quite elaborate programmes for conversion, co-
operation and export, but the objectives of this
ambitious restrucuring will be attained only if the
reform of the counury's economy, including priva-
tisation, takes root and if the government is able to
indicate clearly what kind of defence indusury it
needs for its national security policy and to pro-
vide the financial means to implement it.
X. The Crtmean peninsula
83. As is known, Crimea lost its autonomous
status in the Soviet Union n 1945.In 1954, Cri-
mea was transferred from the Russian Federation
to Ukraine in a symbolic gesture to mark three
centuries of union between both neighbours. After
Ukraine's independence in September 1991, the
Crimean Supreme Soviet declared Crimea to be a
constituent part of Ukraine.
84. When, after Ukraine's independence, the
economic situation deteriorated even more rapidly
than before, the separatist Republican Movement
of Crimea (RDK), led by Yuri Meshkov, had an
easy job in mobilising support from large parts of
the population for a more separatist policy. It
should be noted that65-70Vo of Crimea's 2.7 mil-
lion population is Russian and that many of them
thought they would be better off in a Crimean
peninsula with closer relations, or even reunified,
with Russia.
85. On 9th July 1993, the Russian Supreme
Soviet declared Russian sovereignty over the
Ukrainian port of Sebastopol, the main base of the
Black Sea fleet, but this parliamentary declara-
tion, welcomed by many Russians living in the
Crimea, was criticised by the Russian Govern-
ment which stated that it deviated from its official
policy.
86. In January 1994, Yui Meshkov, leader of
the Republican Party of Crimea, was elected Pre-
sident of the Ukrainian Republic of Crimea. Mr.
Meshkov immediately called for the establish-
ment of an independent Crimea in union with
other CIS states. The Supreme Rada of Ukraine,
however, voted on 24th February 1994 that the
Ukrainian Republic of Crimea should not have the
right to conduct its own foreign, defence and
monetary policies and that it was " not a bearer of
state sovereignty ". In March 1994, President





with about 807o of the Crimean popula-
tion voting in favour of secession.
87. In May, the Crimean parliament restored
the controversial Crimean Constitution, which
was approved by referendum in 1992. At that
moment, the Russian President Yeltsin backed
this move, stating that Crimea was a sovereign
republic. Later, Crimean and Ukrainian ofEcials
started negotiations with the aim of reducing ten-
sion between the two sides.
88. Apparently, the Russian attitude towards
Crimean separatists changed after the election in
July of President Kuchma, who was determined to
improve relations with Russia in all possible
fields while maintaining Ukraine's independence.
89. When in August 1994 the town council of
Sebastopol declared that the city had " Russian
legal status " and was o' de jure part of the Russian
Federation "o this declaration was rebuffed by the
Russian Government. Ukraine's President Kuch-
ma reacted pragmatically by saying that certain
issues had to be resolved at state level.
90. In September, the Crimean Parliament,
dominated by Russians, came into a lasting
conflict with President Meshkov over executive
power. The Ukrainian Supreme Rada amended
the Ukrainian constitution which would enable it
to cancel any Crimean legislation which would
conflict with the Ukrainian constitution. In
November, legislation was adopted which would
automatically invalidate Crimean legislation
deemed to conflict with Ukrainian law.
91. All these decisions, however, did not result
in a more forthcoming and co-operative attitude
from Crimea's political authorities and Crimea
continued to refuse to bring its laws into line with
those of Ukraine. Finally, on 17th March 1995,
the Ukrainian Supreme Rada abolished Crimea's
constitution and sacked President Meshkov,
saying that he should be charged with abuse of
offrce.
92. It should be noted that both President
Meshkov and the Crimean Parliament have lost
much of their popular support in recent months
because they failed to improve the regional eco-
nomy.
93. Russia, still in the process of asserting its
authority over the breakaway republic of Chech-
nya in a bloody military operation, could do little
else but leave Ukraine to settle its own affairs.
The deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma inter-
preted perfectly the Russian authorities' feeling
when he said that Crimea was an internal Ukrai-
nian matter and that Russia would continue to res-
pect Ukraine's territorial integrity and existing
borders.
94. Russia's first depury Prime Minister, Oleg
Soskovets, who visited Kiev on 20th March des-
t2
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pite calls from the Crimean parliament to cancel
his visit, declared that " internal pottical events in
Ukraine are Ukraine's business " ".
95. On 2nd April, President Kuchma put the
Crimean regional government under his direct
control. He further reinstated Anatoli Franchuk,
who had lost a vote of no confidence in the Cri-
mean parliament the week before, as Prime
Minister of the Crimean Government.
96. The Crimean Parliament was given until
15th May to present a new constitution in order to
replace the abolished 1992 constitution which
established Crimea's autonomy.
97. On 15th April 1995, however, President
Yeltsin indefinitely postponed the signing of the
Ukrainian-Russian co-operation treaty planned
for the end of April. President Yeltsin said that he
would sign only after he was convinced " that the
relations between Simferopol and Kiev do not
infringe the interests of the Crimeans "'3.
98. Later, on 18th April, the Russian Foreign
Minister, Andrei V. Kozyrev, stated that Russia
could use arar,ge of diplomatic, political and eco-
nomic means to protect Russians abroad and he
added that " There may be cases when the use of
direct military force may be needed to protect our
compatriots abroad "'0.
XI. The Tbans-Dniestr region of Moldova
99. A thorny problem at Ukraine's western bor-
der is the Trans-Dniestr region, where ethnic Rus-
sians and Ukrainians had been the main suppor-
ters of proclamations of independence in 1990
and 1991. This region had the status of autono-
mous republic within Ukraine until 1940, when it
was united with Bessarabia, a part of Romania
annexed by the Soviet Union which then became
the Soviet Republic of Moldova.
100. Moldova proclaimed sovereignty in 1990
and declared independence in August 1991. The
perspective of a possible future reunification of
Moldova and Romania was one reason for pro-
claiming Trans-Dniestr's independence, first in
1990, then in December 1991. A military cam-
paign by Dniestr leaders to take control of the terri-
tory of the self-proclaimed republic on the Dniestr's
left-bank led to violent armed clashes in the first
half of 1992. The r6le of the Russian 14th Army
during this period has never clearly been asserted.
101. On 21st July, an agreement brokered by
Russia and the CSCE was signed. Moldovan,
Russian and Trans-Dniestr peace-making forces
were deployed, but, despite many negotiations, a
12. Financial Times, 23rd March 1995.
13. International Herald Tribune, l6thApril 1995.
14. International Herald Tribune, l9th April 1995.
solution acceptable to all parties involved has not
yet been found. The new Moldovan constitution,
which came into force in August 1994, estab-
lished a special autonomous status for the Trans-
Dniestr region based on the principle of territorial
integrity, but Trans-Dniesfi insists on recognition
of independence, confederate links to Moldova
and the right to create its own armed forces.
102. On 10th August 1994, an agreement was
reached in negotiations between Russia and Mol-
dova providing for the Russian l4th Army to be
withdrawn from Moldova and the Trans-Dniesff
region within three years. The agreement was
signed by the Prime Ministers of both counffies at
a ceremony in Moscow on 21st October 1994 and,
in November last, the Russian Defence Ministry
announced that the l4th Army's troop sfrength
had been reduced by half, from four battalions to
two. On the other hand, it is said that the three-
year period for withdrawal has not started yet
because of a dispute between Moldova and Russia
over the agreement's interpretation.
103. ln a26th March 1995 referendum, a large
majority of the Trans-Dniestr population (94Vo of
the votes cast) voted in favour of a permanent pre-
sence of Russia's 14th Army on its territory, consi-
dering it to be the best protection against Moldova.
104. Although a reunification of Moldova with
Romania, provoking a full secession of Trans-
Dniestr, is now generally considered to be an
increasingly remote possibility, Ukraine is still
concerned with the volatile situation in this
region. It is concerned about the position of
Ukrainians in the Trans-Dniestr region, but also it
is aware that Russians in the Trans-Dniestr area
have supported Russian separatists in Crimea. lf
the Russian 14th Army is indeed withdrawn from
the Trans-Dniestr area, an agreement will have to
be concluded between Russia and Ukraine for the
transfer of Russian troops through Ukrainian ter-
ritory. Preliminary discussions on such a potential
agreement have already started.
XII. Energy situatian and. the problem
of Chernobyl
105. Since Ukraine's independence, the coun-
tr5r's coal- or gas-fred power stations (accounting
for 597o of energy production) are functioning
only partially because ofreduced coal and natural
gas supply. Hydroelectric power stations produce
only 5Vo of the coungr's elecricity. Nuclear
power stations provide 337o of Ukraine's energy
requirements, but Ukraine is facing considerable
difficulties in this area.
106. The two reactors still operating in Cherno-
byl 
- 
number 1, the oldest of the four and number
3 which is next to the sarcophagus covering the
remains of reactor number 4 
- 
still provide 7Vo of
I3
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Ukraine's energy. On the other hand, the Euro-
pean Union has made the closure of Chernobyl a
condition for releasing the $100 million loan
which it granted to Ukraine n 1994 and for provid-
ing further loans in 1995.
I07. New nuclear power stations are under
construction at Zaporozhye, Rovno and Khmel'
nitskiy. Zaporozhye. financed by Ukraine itself,
should be completed by the end of 1995, but the
two others will not be operational before the end
of 1998 at the earliest. Rovno will be completed
with the assistance of the European Union and the
Group of Seven supports the completion of
Khmel'nitskiy.
108. When the frrll Chernobyl power station is
closed down, reactor waste and contaminated
machinery will have to be disposed of safely. Wes-
tem estimates for the cleaning operation vary bet-
ween $2 and $3 billion, but Ukrainian officials have
put forward figures between $4.5 and $5 billion.
109. On 13th April 1994, a delegation represent-
ing the European Union and the Group of Seven
met in Kiev with representatives of the Ukrainian
Government to discuss the closure of Chernobyl.
Ukraine agreed to close the Chernobyl nuclear
power station by the year 2000 in exchange for
western agreement to help build a gas-fred power
station to replace the nuclear one and to build a
new tomb around reactor number 4 which explo-
ded in 1986 in order to supplement the current
protective cover which is decaying. The details of
the agreement reached are not known at present,
but it should open the way for further financial aid
from the European Union.
110. It is thought, however, that complicated
negotiations over financial aid will still take quite
some time. The United States seems to be reluc-
tant to provide more money beyond what was pro-
mised at the G-7 meeting in Naples in July 1994.
The European Union and the EBRD may be more
forthcoming, but the amounts mentioned have not
in any way been in the range of the $4.5 billion
mentioned by the Chairman of Ukraine's nuclear
power agency.
111. Natural gas supply from Russia has caused
numerous problems for Ukraine since it became
an independent state and the issue is still of great
importance for Ukraine's economic development
and its relations with Russia. In March 1995, it
was agreed that part of Ukraine's debt to Gaz-
prom, Russia's natural gas export company,
would be converted into government bonds. Gaz-
prom is a key instrument in Russia's policy to
obtain economic confrol over former Soviet terri-
tories which are no longer under Moscow's politi-
cal and military control. Gazprom would like to
convert these bonds into stakes ofbetween 35 and
5O7o in key Ukrainian enterprises, including the
enterprise which owns the 33 000 kilometres of
crucial gas pipelines running through Ukraine and
two gas reservoirs. Ukrainian officials have made
it clear that Gazprom may participate in privatisa-
tion, but that it will not be allowed to acquire
interests in the pipeline company. President Kuch-
ma has stated publicly that " the issue of debt can-
not be used to undercut our independence "'s.
tl2. It is true that, even in present circum-
stances, Russia can cut offnatural gas supplies to
Ulraine at any moment, which is indeed a formi-
dable instrument of power. On the other hand, it is
noted that 95Vo of Russian natural gas exports to
the west run through Ukrainian pipelines, giving
Ukraine sufficient possibilities for counter-
measures in the event of intemrption in gas supply.
Il3. At present, Ukraine has an annual require-
ment of 40 million tons of crude oil, now largely
supplied by Russia. In an effort to diversiff its
energy sources, Ukraine has now decided to build
a new oil terminal at Odessa which will handle 12
to 20 million tons of crude oil per year once
construction is completed at the end of 1996. The
oil would initially come to Odessa via the
Bosporus.
ll4. Expansion of the terminal's capacity to
40 million tons per year is planned, but this hinges
on construction of a possible pipeline through
Turkey which should transport Iraqi and Iranian
oil to Ttrrkey's Black Sea port Samsun.
115. Ukraine wants to raise its domestic oil out-
put from 4 million tons in 1994 to 7 million tons
in 2000 and increase its natural gas production
above the 17 billion cubic meffes of 1994 while it
hopes to expand its domestic coal and nuclear
energy sectors.
116. In January 1995, Ukraine reached an agree-
ment with Turkmenistan for delivery of 11 billion
cubic metres of natural gas in 1995. The remain-
der of its needs for 100 billion cubic metres of
natural gas wi,ll be covered by Russian imports
and domestic production.
XI I I. U kraine - Rus sian re latio ns
(a) Commonweahh of Independent States (CIS)
ll7. Together with Russia and Belarus, Ukraine
was a founder member of the Commonwealth of
lndependent States (CIS) when it was proclaimed
in Minsk on Sth December 1991. Ulffaine consi-
dered the CIS an instrument for managing the pro-
blems associated with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and facilitating the ffansition of the new
republics towards complete independence.
118. Ukraine has been suspicious of proposals
for closer integration within the CIS, fearing that
T4
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they might lead to federal or confederal structures
enabling Russia to regain hegemony in the region.
Ukraine did not therefore sign the Minsk agree-
ment on the status of general purpose forces of
February 1992, declaing that its intention was to
establish completely independent national armed
forces. It also did not sign the CIS collective secu-
rity agreement of Tashkent in May 1992. lt has
always refused to join any CIS collective security
body or to participate in CIS joint peace-keeping.
lI9. On the other hand, it is aware that its indus-
try and economy cannot survive without close
links with other republics of the former Soviet
Union. As a consequence, it is interested in the
development of trading and economic links
within the CIS, but only if its sovereign equality
and partnership are respected.
120. However, at the moment it is only an asso-
ciate member of the CIS economic union. When,
in September 1994, the CIS agreed to establish a
payments union and an interstate economic com-
mittee, Ukraine made it clear that it could only
become an associate member of the interstate eco-
nomic committee, taking part only in selected dis-
cussions and that the time was not ripe for partici
pating in the payments union'6.
l2l. At the last CIS summit meeting held in
Alma Ata on 10th February, an informal memo-
randum was adopted and only three of the thirteen
proposals for closer security were passed. A hard
core of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia is deter-
mined to develop close relations, formalised in
bilateral and trilateral agreements on security and
economic issues, which Ukraine so far has not
wished to follow.
122. A pact for peace and stability within the
CIS, which should have been the main achieve-
ment of the Alma-Ata summit meeting, was dilu-
ted considerably into a non-binding memoran-
dum. In bilateral agreements, Russia and
Kazakhstan have promised to remove internal
borders and allow free movement of their citizens
across each other's borders. The Russian anny
will also conduct joint operations and border
patrols with Kazakh forces and have access to
four testing ranges within Kazakhstan. Such
agreements are anathema for llkraine.
I23. At present, it is difficult to predict what rOle
the CIS is going to play. It is noted that if Russia
chooses to shape it into the main vehicle for its
political, military and economic relations with the
other republics of the former Soviet Union, [-Jkraine
may have to accept closer political and military
links within the CIS framework to obtain the eco-
nomic co-operation and access to its traditional
markets that it needs for the recovery and further
development of its very depressed national econ-
omy. Such political and military commitments
could limit its freedom in seeking closer links with
western European and Atlantic institutions.
(b) Relatinns with Russia
1,24. Large parts of what is now Ukraine have
been ffiliated with and dependent on Russia and
later the Soviet Union. Only at the time of the
Russian revolution in l9I7 did it have a brief
period ofindependence before being involved in a
civil war from 1918 to l92l which ended in a
communist victory and Ukraine becoming part of
the USSR.
125. During Soviet rule, Ukraine's territory was
enlarged with eastern Galicia and Volhynia from
Poland, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia from
Romania and finally with the Crimean peninsula
from Russia in 1954.
126. A minority of 11.5 million Russians, repre-
senting 22Vo of l-Ikraine's total population, lives
mainly in the eastern part of the country. In the
Crimean peninsula Russians constitute a 70Vo
majority of the population. As a result of its histo-
ric links with Russia which have also determined
its present state frontiers, political traditions,
armed forces and the structure of its industry, agd-
culture, trade relations and economy, Ukraine has
an ambiguous relationship with Russia.
127. Notwithstanding almost general agreement
among the population on the need to maintain and
protect Ukraine's independence, it is also obser-
ved that the western part of the counffy identifies
with Central and Western Europe, while the eas-
tern and southern parts are more interested in
links with Russia and the CIS.
128. For Ukraine, there have been, and still are,
many reasons to feel uneasy with regard to Russia.
Russia's policy shows a clear tendency towards re-
establishing its former influence in the region.
Russia's policy towards other former Soviet repu-
blics is often assertive, if not condescending,
sometimes with a strong flavour of neo-imperia-
lism. Repeated Russian statements regarding its
claims for peace-keeping and the protection of
Russians, if need be by the use of military force,
have not been particularly reassuring.
I29. The political and economic situation in
Russia is still volatile and unstable. There is no
clear view of what may happen in the near or
more distant future. Developments resulting in
political upheaval and economic chaos would
have an important influence on Ukraine.
130. Ukraine is aware that Russia has a direct
influence on issues related to the existence of
Ukraine as an independent state, such as energy
supply, the situation in the Crimean peninsula and
the division of the Black Sea fleet. The sheer size16. Financial Times, lfth-l lth September 1994.
15
DOCI]MENT 14@
of Russia's economy and its important r6le as a
supplier and a market leave Ukraine with no choice
other than close co-operation. Moreover, it is
noted that Russia plays a leading part in the
restructuring of Europe's securiry environment.
131 . In the frst years of Ukraine's existence as a
separate state, there was an outspoken policy to
emphasise independence and to avoid anything
beyond the most necessary contacts with Russia.
Later, influential voices in the industrial and mili-
tary establishment and the Russian-speaking part
of the population argued in favour of intensifying
relations with Russia, building on the undeniably
close historic, political, economic and cultural
links which had always existed, without insisting
on reintegration.
132. In July 1994, President Kuchma was elec-
ted on a programme including the establishment
of closer special partnership relations with Russia.
Since then, he has implemented this policy with a
pragmatic approach of closer economic relations,
in particular in areas of trade, conversion, techno-
logy development and industrial co-operation,
while strongly maintaining state sovereignty and
independence. Priority was given to negotiations
with Russia on a comprehensive treaty of friend-
ship and co-operation.
133. On 6th February 1995, Russia and Ukraine
agreed on a preliminary draft for this treary which
should be signed by the Presidents of both coun-
tries on the occasion of President Yeltsin's long-
awaited state visit to Kiev. The treaty, which is
considered a most important step towards the nor-
malisation of relations between Ukraine and Rus-
sia, has been negotiated since Ju[y 1994.
134. The issues covered include recognition of
the territorial integnty of Ukraine, the non-viola-
bility of its frontiers and a number of economic
agreements which should improve trade contacts
and secure Russian energy supplies and Ukrainian
payments. A solution is also said to have been
found for the dual citizenship rights of the Rus-
sian minority in Ukraine when Russia gave up its
insistence on a formula which Ukraine categori-
cally refused to accept.
135. Negotiations on the division and location of
the former Soviet Black Sea fleet and on the pre-
sence of Russian military forces in the Crimean
peninsula are still continuing. Russia wants Sebas-
topol to be the main base for the Russian Black Sea
fleet, but this solution is opposed by Ulaaine.
136. During the Defence Commiffee's visit to
Ukraine in early April 1995, the Ukrainian Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs emphasised that the negoti-
ations were being held in a positive atmosphere
and that the Russian Government, with the perso-
nal commitrnent of President Yeltsin, wished to
reach agreement.
137. Since then, however, the situation may
have changed as a result of remarks made by the
Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, to the
effect that Russia could not rule out the use of
force to defend ethnic Russians living in other
republics on the territory of the former Soviet
Union. Ukrainian politicians have described Mr.
KozSnev's statement as provocative and anticip-
ate a deterioration in relations with Russia. In
Kiev, it is believed that the subdued western reac-
tion to Russia's military intervention in Chechnya
has emboldened Russia to adopt a harsher policy
towards other former Soviet republics ''.
138. Apparently, negotiations between Russia
and Ukraine are at such a dfficult stage, if not
stalled, that recently Ukraine asked the United
States for mediation18. Russia is unlikely to agree
to such mediation.
XIV. Pannerchip agre ement
with the European Unian
139. On 14th June 1994, the then President of
Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, signed a co-operation
and partnership agreement with the European
Union. It is no secret, however, that substantive
European Union aid in the future is linked to clos-
ing unsafe nuclear reactorso in particular the two
RBMK reactors which are still operating in Cher-
nobyl.
140. The agreement grants Ukraine most-favou-
red nation treatment. A review conference will be
held in 1998 in order to examine progresa made in
Ukraine towards a market economy and mention
has been made of the possibitty of establishing a
free-ffade zone between the European Union and
Ukraine in the future.
I4l. In the immediate future, the agreement
governs Ukraine's exports to the European Union
of sensitive materials such as coal, steel, nuclear
fuel and textiles. It also contains articles seeking
to liberalise conditions for establishing companies
from European Union member states in Ukraine.
An interim agreement signed on the same day
ensures the coming-into-force of commercial
clauses, but the formal co-operation and partner-
ship agreement will come into force only after
ratification by all European Union member states,
Ukraine itself having ratified it already.
I42. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister and mem-
bers of the Supreme Rada asked the delegation
from the WEU Assembly to do everything pos-
sible to speed up the ratification process in the
European Union's member states because the
partnership agreement is a crucial instrument in
improving Ukraine's economic situation.
17. Financial Timeq22nd-23rd April 1995.
18. Financial Times, 8th May 1995.
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XV Relations between Ukraine andWEII
143. From the ouset of Ukraine's existence as an
independent state, WEU has followed develop-
ments closely, knowing that due to its geographical
situation and its position as the second-ranking of
the former Soviet republics, Ukraine would have a
r6le to play in Europe's new security architecture.
lM. The signature of the trilateral statement on
l4th January 1994 on the elimination of nuclear
arms from Ukraine was considered to be an
important contribution to security and stability in
Europe. In its Kirchberg declaration of 9th May
1994, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that
the fulfilment of these commitments widened the
basis for the development of dialogue and exchange
of information with Ukraine on issues of common
concern. They instructed the Permanent Council
to o'examine appropriate ways in order to achieve
this objective ".
I45. In the following months, the Ukrainian
Government presented a document with its views
on future relations with WEU, including practical
proposals intended to facilitate the attainment of
Ukraine's ultimate objective of fully-fledged par-
ticipation in WEU activities as an associate part-
ner. Ukraine regretted that in the Kirchberg decla-
ration, the Council had limited associate
partnership to the six Central European countries,
plus the Baltic states. It argued that this decision
artificially separated Ukraine from the rest of
Europe, thus destabilising the situation in Europe
as a whole. Aware that associate partnership was
granted to those countries which had concluded,
or would conclude, a Europe agreement with the
European Union, it further argued that this form-
ula no longer corresponded to the political
changes which had since taken place. Ukraine
argued that the chosen line of conduct on associa-
te partnership should be modified when applied to
political co-operation in order to include Ukraine.
Finally, it noted that Ukraine's participation in the
CIS should not be regarded as an obstacle.
146. Although the Council of Ministers did not
react immediately, its Noordwijk declaration of
14th November 1994 stated: " In order to increase
transparency and promote stability throughout
Europe, Ministers underline the particular impor-
tance of establishing appropriate relationships
with Russia and Ukraine. "
147. On 7th March 1995, the Council decided that
contacts with both Russia and Lllcraine, while not
duplicating dialogue in other forums, should allow
for the development of existing dialogue with WEU
and for exchanges of information on issues of com-
mon interest. Consultations are to be held between
the Permanent Representative of the Presidency, the
Secretary-General and the Russian and Ukrainian
Ambassadors respectively, taking into account the
calendar of principal WEU meetings.
148. Other meetings, visits and contacts at diffe-
rent official and diplomatic levels might be held
to contribute to the abovementioned dialogue.
The WEU Institute for Security Studies has been
asked to give greater priority in its future work to
contacts with Russia and Ukraine and the Council
welcomed " efforts by the Assembly aimed at fur-
ther developing contacts at the parliamentary
level ".
WI. Conclusions
149. Although Ukraine could have ranked
among the most important states in Europe due to
its population, size and history, it has only just
started its existence as an independent state,
trying to carve out its rdle in the concert of Euro-
pean nations.
150. The process of asserting its own position is
particularly difficult and painful because of the
fact that for centuries it had been an integral part
of the Russian and, later, Soviet empire. The part-
ition ofjoint political, economic and military pro-
perty between Russia and Ukraine is not finished
and this process will probably take several more
years. In particular, Ukraine's economy is so nar-
rowly connected with the Russian economy that,
at present, it has little chance of surviving without
continued close co-operation. The division of the
Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure is another
issue for seemingly endless negotiations.
151. On the other hand, it can be noted that
Ukraine has made remarkable progress in the little
more than three years of its independence.
152. The implementation of the ffilateral state-
ment on nuclear weapons of January 1994 is pro-
viding the world with a positive example of
nuclear disarmament. Within a yedr, it was fol-
lowed by Ukraine's accession to the nuclear non-
proliferation reaty as a non-nuclear state, which
opened the way for implementation of the
START I Treary and for ratification of START II.
L53. Ukraine also continued to implement its
obligations as regards the CFE Treaty, notwith-
standing its economic problems and serious hesi-
tations over the viability of flank limitations for
its own security and defence.
I54. As regards its security policy, Ukraine has
stated firmly that it is against the re-establishment
of two different blocs in Europe and it has stressed
its neutrality and non-bloc status. Therefore, it did
not sign the 1992 Tashkent agreement on collect-
ive security, nor does it insist on membership of
NATO. In what it is calling a policy of active neu-
trality, Ukraine is conducting a number of activi-
ties which designate it as an active participant in
the process of building security in Europe.
Ukraine is participating in the United Nations
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peace-keeping efforts in the Balkan region. It was
the frst CIS member state to join NATO's part-
nership for peace and it also signed a co-operation
and partnership agreement with the European
Union, while striving for some form of close co-
operation with WEU. Ukraine is also giving acti-
ve support to OSCE activities.
155. Ukraine's policy towards minorities has
been rated positively by both the Council of Eur-
ope, of which it hopes to become a member soon,
and the OSCE.
156. At present, Ukraine is facing two huge pro-
blems which receive priority attention: energy
supplies and recovery of the national economy.
They are closely linked with President Kuchma's
other priority issue: normalisation of relations
with Russia.
157. Ukraine's monetary and budgetary policy
is now in compliance with International Monetary
Fund guidelines and a new, ambitious privatisa-
tion programme is about to start. For its energy
supply in oil and natural gas, Ukraine is heavily
dependent on Russia and Turkmenistan, also
because they extend credits which are not avai-
lable on the world market. Ukraine has started to
seek additional and alternative suppliers in the
Middle East and elsewhere, but has not yet been
able to tackle the serious energy waste which is
one of the unpleasant legacies of the Soviet eco-
nomic system. Chernobyl continues to be a major
stumbling-block for the provision of credits and
aid from the West, which are urgently needed for
economic recovery.
158. The establishment of good relations with
Russia would provide the key to solving many of
Ukraine's problems. There is no certainty as to
whether Russia is really prepared to provide
Ukraine with satisfaction on many economic
issues, which are vital for the country's survival as
an independent state, without imposing its own
political and military conditions. History has
shown that Russia has always needed Ukraine to
assert itself as an empire and superpower in the
region and the world. Will it be prepared to aban-
don this r6le while it is clearly re-establishing its
influence beyond its southern borders?
159. The issues being discussed with Russia
include economic co-operation, energy supply,
the Russian minority in Ukraine, and the division
of the Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure. With
nationalism and the influence of the military in
the ascendance, Chechnya still burning and elec-
tions approaching, Russia is not likely to be a forth-
coming negotiator. Despite the strenuous efforts
of the present Ukrainian Government and the
signing on 6th February 1995 of a preliminary
draft for a treaty of friendship and co-operation, it
may still take some time before all disputed issues
have been solved. Ukraine's recent request for
United States mediation is a clear indication of
Russia's intransigence in the negotiations.
160. What should be Europe's and, in particular
WEU's, attitude in relations with Ukraine?
161. In the past year, the West has become
increasingly aware that an independent, democra-
tic and prosperous Ukraine can play a positive
r61e in enhancing Europe's security. The United
States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,
even called Ukraine " the linchpin of European
security ".
162. The European Union has signed a co-ope-
ration and partnership agreement with Ukraine
which has not yet been ratified by any of its mem-
ber states. A final agreement on the closure of
Chernobyl is now considered the acid test for
Ukraine's determination to reform and break with
the past. But Chernobyl also provides energy
which is a rare commodity in Ukraine. If Europe
wants Chernobyl to be closed down, it will unfor-
tunately have to pay for it: Ukraine does not have
the money. Acceleration of reforms in Ukraine is
greatly dependent on international support and
co-operation. The European Union has the capa-
bilities and resources to do so, and to go ahead
with Ukraine would enhance stability and secu-
rity in Europe.
163. The other field where Europe can extend its
help is security, in particular through WEU. It is
noted, however, that in its Kirchberg declaration,
WEU drew a line through Europe. Only the nine
Central and Eastern European states which had
concluded, or were to conclude, Europe agree-
ments, preparing them for their integration and
eventual accession to the European Union, were
offered an associate partnership with WEU.
Ukraine regretted this decision not only because it
thought that it was artificially separated from the
rest of Europe, but also because it did not want to
become a buffer state between Russia and the rest
of Europe.
164. WEU has now decided to establish an insti-
tutionalised regulardialogue with Ukraine. It would
seem that, at the moment, WEU cannot go beyond
ttris dialogue which should be an intensive one.
165. Ukraine has clearly stated that it wishes to
be neutral and non-aligned. One could argue that
Ukraine's desire to forge closer links with WEU is
fully justified. On the other hand, it is clear that
Ukraine will flust have to sort out its relations with
Russia and the CIS. At the moment, WEU is not
an organisation of neutral states and a member or
associate partner of WEU cannot possibly be part
of the CIS at the same time. Moreovec WEU is
not only the defence component of the European
Union, but also the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. To choose WEU means giving up neu-
trality. The question is whether Ukraine is free to
make its own choice.
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